Two pieces of demographic news hit the headlines in the past few weeks. One, latest sample registration rystem (SRS) report based on 2024 data revealed a nationwide decline in fertility rates. Provisional data, released by the National Family Health Survey 2023-34 on Friday, mirrored this decline. Two, the Andhra Pradesh government proposed incentives in cash and kind for parents who opt to have a third and fourth child. Such a state-sponsored program to incentivize births is a complete turnaround for a nation with a long history of family planning and population control.
The reason? Total fertility rate (TFR) at the national level is now at 1.9, down from 2.9 in 1998-99. While declining fertility is in line with long-term trends, the plunge in TFR to sub-2 levels means the number of children born is not enough to replace the previous generation.
This is not yet a problem for states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, which have relatively high TFRs of 2.35 and 2.98, respectively, per SRS 2024 estimates. But for states with lower TFRs, like Andhra Pradesh (1.68) and Karnataka (1.67), the consequences are serious, and include reduced parliamentary representation, tighter local labour supply, and the economic burden of managing an
Three points about these fertility trends are worth highlighting. First, TFR has dropped below the replacement fertility rate, which is defined as the fertility rate at which have enough children to replace themselves and their partners. Second, couples are increasingly opting to have fewer children. Third, fertility aspirations are changing, especially in urban India.
Higher replacement levels
For advanced countries, the replacement rate is pegged at 2.1 children per woman, on the assumption that 98% of girls will attain reproductive age, and the sex ratio at birth will remain around the biologically natural ratio of 952 girls to 1,000 boys.
These assumptions completely break down in India. In 2024, at a national level, the sex ratio at birth is 918 girls to 1000 boys, and calculations based on SRS life tables show that only 96.4% of females are likely to attain the age of 15. Once we account for India’s higher mortality rate and lower sex ratio, its replacement rate goes up to around 2.2 in 2024.
Meanwhile, only three states have a sex ratio at or better than the natural ratio (Kerala, Chhattisgarh, Himachal Pradesh); and females have a 98% or higher chance of survival up to age 15 in only four states (Delhi, Jammu & Kashmir, Tamil Nadu, Kerala). As a result, the adjusted replacement fertility rate for every state, except Kerala, is higher than 2.1. This effectively raises the bar: states face a larger shortfall in TFR after these adjustments.
A comparison of actual fertility rates with state-specific replacement rates shows that only Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan are comfortably above replacement; Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh just about clear the threshold. The worst off are the southern states, highly urbanized regions (Delhi, Maharashtra), West Bengal, and Punjab. It is not surprising, then, that chief ministers of at least two southern states are calling for their people to have more children.
The TFR itself is a function of two variables: the proportion of women having children, and the average number of children born per woman. If every woman of reproductive age had two children, TFR would be 2. But if some women are childless, others need to have more children to push up the average count of children and thereby raise TFR. Unfortunately, both components of TFR are moving adversely in India. Couples are increasingly opting to have fewer children. Research based on national family health surveys shows that the share of women who were childless at the end of their reproductive life (40-49 years) increased from 7% in 2015-16 to 12% in 2019-21 (numbers for 2023-24 have not yet been released). While still low by global standards—the number is close to 20% in some advanced countries—there is a clear societal shift towards smaller families. Indeed, the leftward shift in the distribution of the number of children is obvious when tracked over a two-decade horizon.
Changing aspirations
Fertility aspirations are changing, especially in The old two-child ideal is being gradually replaced by a one-child or no-child family. This is reflected in the “wanted” fertility rate-the level of fertility that would result if all unwanted births were prevented. Wanted fertility rates are falling across both low and high fertility states, signaling that the desire to have fewer children is a nationwide phenomenon.
Many factors drive this decline—of women, delayed age of marriage, financial considerations, exposure to and availability of contraception, urbanization, and the breakdown of traditional joint families.
A Financial Times article, published on 16 May, links falling global birth rates to greater use of smartphones. While that connection is a stretch, rapid internet penetration and social media exposure have likely accelerated the adoption of global trends and exposed young Indians to ideas and ambitions that were inaccessible earlier.
At the same time, pre and post-natal care and child nutrition have improved significantly, so that childbirth is safer, and maternal and child health outcomes are much better than before (shows the latest NFHS-6, 2023-24 data). But a healthy birth is not enough; raising a child through adulthood has high social and economic costs. Therefore, the challenge for policymakers is to balance changing family ideals and aspirations with creating socio-economic structures that encourage and support parents in child-rearing.
The author is an independent writer in economics and finance.