The 18th BRICS summit, being hosted by India on 12-13 September, comes at a crucial geopolitical moment. The bloc has expanded, positioning itself as a multipolar alternative to Western-dominated institutions, giving it greater economic weight and a broader claim to represent the Global South. However, its size also brings a new challenge: internal rivalries. With more geopolitical competitors now sitting around the same table, the summit this year will test the limits of the global bloc as well as how it brings consensus amid deep divisions within its own ranks.
Rising stakes
What was originally a group of five nations has now expanded to 11, with Indonesia being the latest addition. Adding to its economic strength, the Bloc now accounts for 29.1% of the global GDP in 2025, up from 19.7% in 2009, when the Bloc was formed. Though the BRICS+ GDP is dominated by China, accounting for 60.4% of the total, India and Russia also bring economic and political heft. The bloc has also closed its gap with the G7—a group of seven countries including the US, the UK, Germany, and France, among others. G7’s GDP share, which stood about 33 percentage points higher than ’, now is only 15 percentage points higher compared to the expanded group.
Fault lines
Despite its growing economic footprint, the bloc remains divided by internal frictions. The most prominent fault line this year has emerged between the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran, the two countries on opposite sides of the that began in February. The conflict has seen Iran launch attacks against the UAE and Saudi Arabia, the latter being a key US ally, further exposing the geopolitical contradictions within the bloc. As a result, the BRICS Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in New Delhi concluded without a joint declaration. The host country, India, issued only a chair’s statement and an outcome document, indicating a breakdown in consensus among member states. These frictions go beyond the current year, with India and China known as economic competitors and geopolitical rivals.
De-dollarization push
BRICS has made a de-dollarization push to reduce reliance on the US dollar to protect member states from sanctions and currency volatility. The efforts even invited the ire of US President Donald Trump last year when he threatened a 100% tariff if the bloc sought to move away from dollars. While a wider de-dollarization has not happened yet and is unlikely to happen anytime soon, the projects funded by BRICS’ New Development Bank have seen the share of the dollar decline to below 60%, while other currencies such as the South African rand have seen a rise. After the dollar, the Chinese yuan is often used for financing.
Uneven trajectory
This shift remains slightly uneven. Projects in many of the member countries are still heavily dominated by either the US dollar or their own currency. Over 73.3% of the total value of projects financed by the NDB in China has been funded in yuan, while 57% in India has been funded in rupee.
Similarly, South African rand makes up 29% of the projects funded in the country. While there is a push to move away from the US dollar, other currencies like the euro and Swiss franc—West-dominated currencies—also have a notable presence, especially in China, Brazil, and Russia. Nevertheless, this signals a gradual diversification away from the dollar’s dominance.
The trade-off
One litmus test of a bloc’s internal cohesion is the strength of trade among its members. By this measure, BRICS+ appears to have done well. Data from the UN Trade and Development shows that intra-bloc trade has grown substantially since 2009. BRICS+ intra-trade stood at $1.2 trillion in 2025, growing 72% since BRICS’ formation. If BRICS+’s intra-trade stood at $100 in 2009, it had risen to $338 by 2025—well ahead of other major groupings.
Southeast Asia, which has many members from the Asean bloc, followed at $210, while the G20 and EU remained below $200. The rapidly growing trade between BRICS+ countries helps its standing at a time when the Western countries are seemingly becoming more closed off.
India’s vulnerability
BRICS+ has grown stronger in trade, and India’s trade ties with the UAE and Russia have benefited the country. However, a close look shows India’s trade relationship with the bloc remains notably import-dependent. BRICS+ accounted for 41.5% of India’s imports, with China, the UAE and Russia making up a substantial share.
In contrast, the bloc accounted for 22.3% of India’s total exports in 2025–26, highlighting a considerable gap between India’s dependence on the bloc as a source of imports and its ability to export into the grouping. It is also noteworthy that India only has free-trade agreements with two members—the UAE and Indonesia, making a case for a greater push for India’s interests within the bloc since it’s the second-largest country by .