For BigBasket co-founder Vipul Parekh, profitability matters more than market share, even as competition intensifies in quick commerce.
“It is very easy to have market share and never make money,” he told Mint in an interview. The Tata group-backed company is willing to “surrender market share” if required to improve profitability, he said, adding: “It is not important to be in the top three, four or five. It is important to be profitable.”
However, the comments show a change in the online grocery platform’s approach after it failed to achieve its target of seizing market share from new-age rivals such as Blinkit, Zepto, and .
About a year ago, its employees had received an email from co-founder and chief executive Hari Menon urging them to gear up as it planned to expand across categories and become the number two player in .
The email was sent as the platform, which primarily offered slotted delivery services since its inception in 2011, shifted its focus to BB Now, its 10-minute delivery service.
Cut to today, the platform is not even in the top three in terms of market share in the quick-commerce sector. According to industry estimates, Zomato’s Blinkit leads with a 46% market share by gross merchandise value (GMV). Swiggy’s Instamart has a 27% share, Zepto 21%, and BigBasket’s BB Now just 7%.
The company’s revenue declined 1.9% year-on-year to ₹9,866.7 crore, while its net loss widened 41.8% to ₹2,006.8 crore in 2024-25.
According to Parekh, one of the biggest reasons for Big Basket’s relatively slower scale-up in quick commerce was the challenge of transforming an already established business model. Unlike newer entrants built entirely around instant deliveries, it had spent years building a scheduled-delivery business before consumer preference rapidly shifted towards 10-minute delivery.
“The incumbents have too much at stake and far more invested,” he said. It is not so easy to demolish an existing business and start a new one.”
The company had operated both models simultaneously for years before fully integrating BB Daily and BB Now around a year ago. As part of the transition, it shut several smaller dark stores and shifted towards larger-format warehouses capable of carrying significantly larger assortments.
To be sure, in April, Amazon said it would expand its quick-commerce arm Amazon Now to 100 cities, including Meerut, Panipat, Vizag, and Mysuru. It is also expanding its dark store network to 1,000 “micro-fulfilment centres”, as part of the tech giant’s ₹2,800 crore investment in the country. Flipkart Minutes plans to have 1,200 dark stores in 250 cities by June this year.
Profitability over scale
Parekh said Big Basket’s path to profitability would come from getting customers to buy more items per order, expanding into higher-margin categories, and operating larger dark stores with wider assortments, helping it generate more sales and improve profitability per store.
Soumya Chauhan, principal-investments at Dutch investment group Prosus, which is a stakeholder in rival Swiggy, said Big Basket’s strategy reflects the difficult trade-off most quick-commerce players are currently facing. “It’s a rational choice given their position, but still risky, as slowing growth could allow more aggressive rivals to strengthen customer loyalty and expand their dark-store networks faster.”
She said that expanding into non-grocery categories is critical for profitability as these categories typically drive higher margins and larger order values.
The company is not looking to raise external capital for now, with Tata Digital, its parent entity and largest shareholder with a 64% stake, continuing to fund the business internally.
“From an outsider’s perspective, we see this as a net positive, no fundraising pressure, no valuation anxiety, and patient capital,” Chauhan said. “But internal funding also comes with competing priorities within the Tata group and requires strong alignment between management and shareholders.”
Parekh said profitability across the sector remains under pressure as multiple players continue chasing the same urban customers through discounts and aggressive spending. Consumers are also increasingly switching between apps based on offers, making loyalty harder to build, he said.
He added that quick commerce risks becoming similar to the airline industry, where rapid growth did not necessarily translate into profits. “Eventually, businesses get judged on profitability. Nobody gets valued on growth rate forever.”
Reaching a plateau
The comments come at a time when India’s quick-commerce sector is beginning to show signs of growth moderation after nearly three years of breakneck expansion.
reported on 8 May that in the March quarter, Blinkit’s net order value grew 8% sequentially to ₹14,386 crore, slower than the 13% quarter-on-quarter growth reported in the previous quarter, while Instamart’s gross order value fell sequentially to ₹7,881 crore from ₹7,938 crore.
The moderation suggests the country’s quick-commerce sector, while still growing rapidly, is beginning to normalize as competition intensifies and urban penetration deepens.
“Growth rates are now naturally moderating off a much larger base,” Eternal, the parent of Blinkit, said in its fourth-quarter shareholder letter.
Albinder Dhindsa, CEO of Eternal, said heavy discounting was driving “poor-quality growth” centred around low-margin products, while Sriharsha Majety, CEO and co-founder of Swiggy, said the good-delivery giant was focusing on “differentiation-led” growth rather than relying purely on discounts.